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Abstract 
Globalization has become a buzz word describing the trend in many, if not most 
industries. Some authors have viewed this trend as a constraint on national policy and it 
has been especially viewed as a problem for those dirigiste governments which seek to 
protect their national cultures from American dominance. This article examines the 
globalization of the media industry and analyzes Korean policy toward this industry. The 
Korean case is compared to the policies of other countries, particularly that of France 
which exhibits many similarities. The argument here is that the theory on "cultural 
imperialism" as well as the critiques of globalization theory as it applies to mass media are 
inappropriate. Private sector strategies which seek transnational alliances with American 
firms are best suited to produce competitive products which, in turn, are likely to best 
presenre national culture. 
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I . Introduction 
Gbbalization has become an omnipresent buzz word in both academic journals 
and the popular press.') Public discourse now takes it for granted that nearly all 
economic activity is either practiced on or headed for a global scale. Naturally, it 
is a matter of both opinion and interest as to whether the globalization 
phenomenon is good or bad. Certainly, jobs, income, and standards of living hang 
in the balance. Less obvious, but equally salient is the issue of culture. As goods 
are assembled in different countries and marketed in yet others, as consumerism 
reaches global proportions, and as capitalism--in the diminished presence of its 
longtime Communist rival-- goes almost unchallenged as an organizing principal, 
American capitalism looms especially large. In one particular case, it is not just 
American capitalism, but also the influence of American culture that has raised 
concerns. This is the case of the American television and film industries. 
Two countries which have diverged considerably from American styles of 
capitalist management are France and South Korea?) Both have relied on 
si@icant levels of state intervention (often denoted by the French word, 
dirigisme) to manage their economies and both have pursued state-led strategies 
to encourage film and television production. In a sense, dirigisme in the arts is 
as conventional for these countries as their support of national champion finns 
and chaebols. However, what is less known is that media strategies in both 
countries are really bifurcated. While the state in each case subsidizes national 
media production, the respective private sectors have pursued global strategies 
to support local media industries. For example, both French and Korean firrns 
pursue global alliances to support their performance in national markets. Our 
argument is that international alliances improve the competitive capacity of 
1) A recent academic volume which reviews the theory behind globalization quite seriously 
is Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity and G l o w  Capitalism 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). For a critical appraisal of the globalization 
literature in international relations, see Richard Falk, "State of Siege: Will Globalization 
Win Out? IntematiorzQl Aflairs, 73. 1 (1997). pp. 123- 136. 
2) The literature on the political economies of these two countries is huge. For a brief 
summary of the dirigiste approach, see John Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). chap. 1; for a discussion of dirigisme in Korea. 
see, among others, Jung-En Woo, Race to the Sw$: State and Finance in Korean 
Industrialization (New York: Columbia University Press, 199 1). for a similar discussion 
on dirigisme in France, see Harvey B. Feigenbaum, The Politics of Public Enterprise: Oil 
and the French State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). chap. 1. 
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domestic firms and allow them to offer more attractive products to both national 
and international markets. To paraphrase a slogan from American bumper 
stickers, these firms think globally to act locally.3) 
11 . Globalization of the Film and Television Industries 
Film and television markets are, of course, dominated by uHollywood". The 
latter is a term which is the normal short-hand for the American entertainment 
industry, but it requires very little stretch of imagination to understand that 
Hollywood production extends well beyond the borders of the United States, let 
alone those of the county of Los Angeles, or the state of California.4) Today, 
films, television shows, and commercials are shot around the globe.5) 
Post-production may take place in Vancouver, London, Prague, Queensland, or 
many other locales. Personnel working in the industry, be they Australian 
directors, French actresses, or Hungarian cinematographers, are hardly limited by 
nationality. Any combination may work in Hollywood one week and Switzerland 
the next. This has been true for a long time, starting with the emigration of 
talent from Europe before the Second World War. 
Additionally, the famous studios which still finance most uHollywood" 
productions are no longer clearly American.6) The Sony Corporation of Japan 
bought Columbia Studios along with TriStar and Orion; Seagrams of Canada 
bought Universal from Matsushita; while, through a default of the Paretti empire, 
the French state bank, Cr'idit Lyonnais, inherited MGM-United Artists, until it 
3) The thought behind the bumper sticker is that international problems are solved by 
starting Arst with local problems. The argument of this paper reverses that dictum. 
4) In fact, retaining production in California has become a significant concern of local and 
state officials. See, for example, The Public Affairs Coalition of the Alliance of Motion 
Picture and Television Producers, 'The Economic Impact of Motion Picture, Television 
and Commercial Production in California," Santa Monica: The Monitor Company, 1994. 
5) Three recent examples of commercially successful television shows produced outside of 
Hollywood are Highlander (Europe), Hercules and Xena (both shot in New Zealand). 
6) The break up of the "studio system" required by the US Supreme Court after its 
P m u n t  decision in 1948, led to the rise of a plethora of production companies. but 
enormous financial needs of film and television production meant that the studios 
retained dominance through their control of finance, in a system not unlike the keiretsu 
of Japan. See Harvey B. Feigenbaum, "Why Hollywood is Like Japan, Only Better," 
Business and the Contemporary World, 8, 1 (1996). 
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could sell it back to the grasp of Kirk Kirkorian (who had owned it earlier and 
sold off many of its assets). While a simcant amount of production remains in 
California, the entertainment industry can easily claim to be among the most 
advanced along the path to globalization. 
The tendency to think of Hollywood as being "American", however, is not 
necessarily incorrect. Not only are the studios incorporated under American law, 
but the bulk of their employees quai@ for American passports. Additionally, over 
three hundred thousand of the industry's workers reside in California.7) The 
reasons behind the competitive scale of Hollywood, however, are almost certainly 
due to its incubation in the American domestic market. Access to over two 
hundred million prosperous consumers in a single country, speaking a common 
language, allowed for amortization of large expenses of over a huge internal 
market. Exports could then be sold abroad for derisively small amounts, 
relatively speaking, which dwarfed the unit costs of shows and movies produced 
outside of the United States. 
I t  has been argued that the economic structure of Hollywood is especially well 
suited for exporting to the world market, and that this is primarily because it is an 
industrial cluster based on "flexible specializationU.8) This insight comes from recent 
theory in political economy. Michael Piore and Charles Sable, borrowing from 
Regulation theory, have put a great deal of stress on the evolution of production 
systems away from mass production and towards specialized batch production.9) 
7) 348,000 Californians work in Alm, telmsion, and commercial production, and the number 
climbs to over 534.00 if one includes peripheral activities such as video games, theaters. 
production equipment, and broadcasting: See, The Public Affairs Coalition, ''The 
Economic Impact.. . " . 
8) Michael Storper,'The Transition to Flexible Specialization in the US Film Industry: 
External Economies, the Division and the Crossing of Industrial Divides," in 
Post-Fordism: A Reader, ed. Ash Amin (London: Blackwell, 1994)' originally published in 
Cambridge Journal of Economics (1989), 13, 2. Cf. Michael J. Piore and Charles F. 
Sable, The Second Industrial Divide (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Harvey B. 
Feigenbaum and Stephen C. Smith, 'The Political Economy of the Maryland 
Biotechnology Cluster," Business and the Contemporary World, 5, 4 ( Autumn 1993), 
Harvey B. Feigenbaum. 'Why Hollywood is Like Japan-- Only Better," Business and the 
Contemporary World, 8, 1 (1996). pp 36-42. 
9) Michael Piore and Charles Sable, The Second Industrial Divide (New York: Basic Books, 
1984); Robert Boyer, The Regulation School: A Critical Introduction (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1990), trans. Craig Charney; Alfredo C. Robles, Jr., "Global Governance 
and Political Economy," Global Governance, 1 (1995), pp. 99- 117. 
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Industrial clusters are geographical areas where there are many firms in the 
same basic business. They form various relationships, such as joint-ventures, 
sub-contracts, partnerships, and the like, in order to make small batches of 
products which change from batch to batch, according to very volatile demand. 
At the heart of the cluster is a mobile workforce of highly skilled technicians who 
move from one company in the cluster to another, depending on the project. 
Since the collapse of the Studio System, a consequence of the US Supreme 
Court's 1948 Pcuamount decision ordering the separation of the studios from 
their chains of theaters, Hollywood left the era of mass production and entered 
the era of flexible specialization.lo) Rather than studios keeping large staffs under 
contract, teams are put together on a project by project basis, frequently under 
the impetus of an agent or independent producer. This form of organization 
keeps fixed costs down, allows each project to be "tailor-made", and does not 
lock anyone into a long term commitment to a particular product or genre. This 
kind of production system is only viable where there are large concentrations of 
skilled labor (actors, writers, directors, technicians) and where there is a presence 
of general use equipment (e.g., sound stages, post-production facilities, sophisticated 
cameras and lights, etc.). 
It has frequently been argued, as well, that the number of people speaking 
Enghsh as a first or second language throughout the world gave an edge to films 
and movies produced in the language of William Shakespeare, Edgar Allan Poe 
and Mohandas Gandhi. We take issue with this argument, since most of the 
world watches Hollywood productions dubbed into their own languages. 
Much of the dominance of the American industry can be attributed to historical 
circumstance. Before the First World War, France exported more films to the US 
than vice-versa. However, by the end of the Second World War, no country could 
compete with the American industry on world markets. This was partially due to 
the factors listed above, as well as the fact that the cumulative effect of the world 
wars was a backlog of film created on the untouched American soil, ready for 
export to countries whose own production had been suspended during the 
10) Storper, op. cit., pp. 200-207. Curiously, the decision of the Federal Communication 
Commission to rescind "fin-syn" regulations, which required television networks to 
purchase programs from outside the company has brought back the vertically 
integrated entertainment firm. The recent acquisition by Disney of Capital Cities/ABC 
can only be understood in this light. See Bronwen Maddox, "The Price of Hit and 
Miss," Financial Times, 2 August 1995, p. 1 1. 
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fighting. 1 1) 
The second historical factor that gave Hollywood the edge was the early 
development of private television networks. Unlike most countries which viewed 
television, like radio before it, as appropriate for nationally-owned broadcasting 
companies, the US viewed television as a commercial product right from the 
start. The creation of many independent stations created a secondary market for 
f h  and television products. Therefore, production costs were not borne solely by 
the network which originally bought the film or W show, but by many smaller 
broadcasters who bought products as re-runs (old movies and old television 
shows). Thus producers could afford more lavish productions by spreading the 
costs over primary and secondary markets. By the time these products reached 
international markets, most or all of their costs had already been amortized, 
allowing international customers to purchase television shows with high 
production costs for very modest fees. 
Cultural Imperialism? 
Does globalization of the media industry have negative consequences? The 
availability of high quality American films and cheaply priced television shows led 
to fears of "cultural imperialismw. The term "cultural imperialism" has frequently 
been employed in scholarly works (and political rhetoric) with a diversity of 
meanings. To some it has meant the "use of political and economic power to 
exalt and spread the values and habits of a foreign culture at the expense of a 
native culture."l2) To others, it has meant the instrumental spread of cultural 
values in support of a political and economic system,l3) mostly in support of 
capitalism-- and for many, in support of American hegemony. 
For radical critics such as Herbert Schiller, the spread of American mass media 
products can be understood only as part and parcel of a world capitalist system.14) 
1 1) John Izod, HoUywood at the Box O@e, 1895- 1986 (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1988). 
12) A. Bullock and 0. Stallybrass, eds., The Fontana Dictionary of Modem Thought 
(London: Fontana, 1977), p. 303, quoted in John Tornlinson, Cultural Imperialrsm 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University FYess, 199 1). p. 3. 
13) Tomlinson, p. 3. 
14) Herbert Schiller. 'Transnational Media and National Development", in Schiller and K. 
Nordenstring, National Sovereignty and Intemathnal Communication (New Jersey: Ablex, 
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Here, the role of mass media emanating from the core of developed countries 
serves as an ideological support of the world capitalist regime, directly analogous 
to the role of ideological structures at the national level posited by diverse 
Marxists such as Louis Althusser or those of the Frankfurt Sch001.15) 
Along the same lines, two Chileans writing during the Allende regime, Ariel 
Dorfrnan and Armand Mattelart, argued that apparently harmless entertainments 
actually couched imperialist values. The title of their famous book is self 
explanatory: How to Read Donald Duck Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Corni 
c.16) I t  is, however, a long step from detecting values in a particular work to 
demonstrating that such works actually result in some form of domination. It  is 
not obvious that those perceiving the symbols provided attach the same meaning 
to them as the purveyors may wish. As Scott notes, "subordinate groups develop 
their own interpretations, understandings, and readings of ambiguous terms."l7) 
1979); cf. Irnrnanuel Wallerstein, ''The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist 
System," Cornpar- Studies in Society and Histo y, 16, 4 ( September 1974). 
15) Louis Althusser, For M a n  (London: Penguin 1969); T. Adorno and M. Horkheimer, The 
Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York Seabury Press, 1972). 
16) New York: International General Editions, 1975; cited in Tornlinson, p. 41. 
17) James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). p. 
338, quoted in Nathan J. Brown, Peasants in Modem Egypt (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1990), p. 16. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that as the 
distance between the consumers and producers of movies and television shows 
increases, the cultural references become less familiar, more ambiguous, and 
consequently more open to local interpretation. Citing a study by Katz and Uebes, 
"Mutual Aid in the Decoding of Dallas: Preliminary Notes from a Cross-Cultural Study," 
Tornlinson notes: 
One of the Arabic groups actually "misread" the information of the programme in 
a way which arguably made it more compatible with their cultural horizon. In 
the episode viewed, Sue Ellen had taken her baby and run away from her 
husband JR, moving into the house of her former lover and his father. However, 
the Arab group confirmed each other in the more conventional reading -- in their 
terms -- that she had actually gone to live in her own father's house. The 
implications of this radical translation of the events of the narrative must at 
least be to undermine the notion that texts cross cultural boundaries intact. 
(cited in Tornlinson, p. 48) 
It is, of course, the increasing familiarity with exogenous cultural references that some 
of critics equate with cultural imperialism. It would seem that familiarity alone is a 
deceptive standard. 
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Tornlinson rightly argues that the advocates of the "cultural imperialist" view tend 
to assert, rather than prove, that the consumers of cultural products are thereby 
subjected to domination.18) However, neither the concern, nor the lack of proof, 
that Hollywood has nefarious effects on national cultures is limited to those 
defending the alleged periphery. 
Concerns that local culture may be diluted or changed by exposure to cultural 
influence emanating from the international market (read, "America") have 
motivated many countries to protect and subsidize their national film and 
television markets. Even such free-trade enthusiasts as the Germans offer 
si@icant, though not necessarily effective, subsidies to their national audio- 
visual industries.19) The British historically taxed movie tickets20) to pay for local 
production, but later abandoned the technique. The Film Board of Canada 
finances many high quality features by Canadian f~lrnmakers. By far, however, 
the most elaborate system of subsidies for film and television production have 
been devised by the French ministry of culture.21) In 1994 subsidies to film and 
18) Tomlinson, p. 38. This weakness is possibly due to the fact that most authors making 
the charge of "cultural imperialism" are trained in literature or philosophy, rather than 
social science. Those with social science training either focus on content analyses of 
texts such as news broadcasts, thus avoiding a study of the impact of such texts, or 
they study the impact of television in such a way as not to call into question the 
economic organization of the society: viz., the impact of violence in programming or 
news reporting of terrorism. To the extent that the analysis is political rather than 
psychological. the focus is on the way in which broadcasts affect the priority of those 
issues treated by the electoral elites, with little concern for the issues which do not 
make it to the state agenda at all. See for example, regarding violence and terrorism, 
William H. Meyer, ITfansnational Media and Third World Development: The Structure 
and Impct of Imperialism (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988). chapter 5 (Meyer does 
try to examine Schiller's propositions empirically, but we found his attempts to 
operationalize the concepts too problematic to discount Tomlinson's critique); For a 
typical analysis on agenda-setting, see Lee B. Becker, Maxwell E. McCombs and Jack 
M. McLeod, 'The Development of Political Cognitions," in Political CommunicQtiox 
Issues and Strategies for Research, ed. Steven H .  Chaffee (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1975). 
The weakness of the agenda-setting literature was criticized early on by Peter 
Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power," American Political Science 
Reuiew, 57 (1963). pp. 947-52. 
19) Ron Holloway, "Few Returns on German Grants," Hollymod Reporter, 5 July 1995, p. 1-4. 
20) i.e., the "Eady Levy." 
21) Jean-Pierre Fougea, Anne E. Kalck, Pascal Rogard, Les Aides au Financement (Cinknm 
et T&ision), (Paris: Dixit, 1993). 
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television production from the compte de soutien amounted to almost 1.7 billion 
francs, or about $354 million at 1995 exchange rates?) 
Responses to American media domination have not been limited to the policies of 
national governments. The European Union has also actively subsidized these 
industries. A number of programs under the broad umbrella "Media" managed by 
the Commission's Directorate General X with a budget of 200 million Ecu, are 
intended to facilitate co- productions and to subsidize training and script writing.23) 
These are complemented by the Council of Europe's similar, but much smaller 
"Eurirnage" program (32 million Ecu) aimed at promoting tripartite coproductions 
which include the smaller countries of Europe.24) 
IV . French Media Protectionism: A Closer View 
Since most analysts concerned with media protectionism tend to point critically 
at France, it is perhaps worth a closer look. The French approach to television 
and film production has been two-pronged, emphasizing regulation of the 
domestic market and subsidies to television and film production. A very 
important regulatory agency is the Conseil Supkieure de l'Audiovisuel(CSA), which 
is France's equivalent of the US Federal Communication Commission, the FCC. 
Like the FCC, the CSA manages spectrum allocation and can impose sanctions 
on networks for various infractions of its rules.25) The CSA also regulates the 
content of broadcasts, in that violent or sexually explicit shows must air after 
10:30 PM. Perhaps most important, however, is the CSA's function as manager of 
the French quota system. I t  is here that the major contrast between American 
and French audio visual policies appear. The role of the US Federal Government 
in mass media is essentially a regulatory one, while the French combine 
regulation with promotion. The quotas are a key tool in the promotion of the 
22) Conseil Sugrieure de l'Audiovisue1, et al., Les Ch@?es Cl6s de la Td&ision et du 
Cin&mx France 1994; (Paris: Documentation Franqaise, 1995) p. 67 
23) European Commission, DG X, Media: Guide for the Audiovisual Industry (Brussels: 
European Commission, June 1994); Fogea et al.; The European Union, however, 
justifies the policy in terms of skills and employment, rather than cultural threat. 
24) Fogea, et al., p. 27; interview with a French feature film producer, Paris, September, 
1994. 
25) The predecessor of the CSA could only take the stations to administrative court, i.e., 
the renowned Conseil d'Etat. 
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French media products industry, that is, movies and television shows. 
The purpose behind the broadcast quotas is to preserve for French products 
50% of fictional shows (news, sports and games do not count toward the quota). 
As the former president of the CSA put it, T o  impose a law that says a 
country's television dedicates 50% of its airtime to its own culture is not 
unreasonable. A country which abandons its culture and which accepts that its 
children are influenced by a foreign culture renounces its own identity and 
renounces its reason to exist."26) Indeed, within the European Union, French 
representatives have advocated an EU quota of 60% of airtime resewed for 
products of European origin throughout the EU, although the Commission has 
acceded to these only as guidelines "wherever possibleU.27) 
Most local producers interviewed for this study, in F'rance, Britain and 
Australia, independently underlined that when given the choice, most of their 
respective audiences prefer television shows produced at home to American 
imports. As a French CSA commissioner put it, "Fkench people prefer to watch 
French actors driving French cars on French streets in French towns." However, 
the costs to broadcasters of American reruns which have already been amortized 
in the US market are so tempting that, as one French producer remarked: "we 
live by quotas." 
The French have also implemented perhaps the most elaborate system of 
subsidies to production of any of the European countries. While it is the function 
of the CSA to manage broadcast quotas, the administration of production 
subsidies is left to the Centre National de la Cineatographie. The decision to 
subsidize particular films is governed by an elaborate qu-g system to assure 
that most of the content is produced in France by French artists. Moreover, the 
actual decisions are left to committees of industry professionals who have shown 
a decided tendency to award grants to their friends, a system the French 
cynically call "copinage" (a pejorative term meaning "friendship networks*). 
Financial aid to film production was put in place in 1948, while 
assistance to television production dates to 1984.28) Those in the industry 
usually point out that, technically, these subsidies are not supported by state 
funds, but rather are financed mostly by taxes on movie tickets (called the 
T.S.A.", or Taxe s w  1'Audwvisuel) which go directly to the compte de soutien 
26) Jacques Boutet, "Q&A with Jacques Boutet," Variety, 19-25 April 1989, p. 104. 
27) Television sans Frontieres directive of 1989. 
28) Cours des Comptes, Le Soutien _financier de l'etat B l'industrie ~Wnmtographique et ti 
l'industrie des programmes ~ i o v i s u e l s  (Paris: rnimeo), June 1993, p. 103. 
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(support account). However, even if one allows that money from increased ticket 
prices is not a "state fund", this claim is only partially true. While the "support 
account" is primarily supplied by the tax on the purchase of movie tickets, the 
state also contributes directly to the fund. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly. French f h s  are supported by 
pre-production finance from French television networks. French networks must 
spend at least 1% of their turnover on film fmance, usually including an 
agreement to air the f h  on TV. Canal Plus, though a privately-owned pay- 
television channel, must by law devote 9% of its turnover, about 2 billion francs 
per year, to financing French film production.29) Indeed, the combined aid and 
distribution from French television is in reality so huge that virtually all French 
films find their way to the airwaves, whatever the verdict of theatergoers.30) 
V . Korean Policy Toward Entertainment Media 
The Korean approach to the entertainment industry is also oriented toward both 
regulation and subsidies. However, Korea, unlike France, rhetorically endorses the 
concept of free markets while maintaining a highly dirigiste policy. When we asked 
Mr. Ok-Hwan Wi, Director of the Motion Picture Division of the Ministry of 
Culture and Sports, if the government is interested in creating a viable film and 
T V  industry in Korea, he replied that "the government is apparently interested in 
this, but does not Micially encourage it. The government leaves this to the free 
market system."31) Similarly, when asked if Korean companies are encouraged to 
divers@ into media industries, Mr. Wi replied: 
The Korean government does not artitlcially encourage companies to do 
so. There have been no tax incentives, favors, and inducements on the 
part of the government. I think this is due to the fact that the media 
industry's relative importance among overall industries is small.32) 
29) Michel Pascal, "Entretien avec Ren6 Bonnell: 'Le Cinma fran~ais va mourir vertueux'," 
Le Point, no. 1181, 8 May 1995. In Britain, a similar, though smaller, role is played 
by Channel 4 in financing national film production. 
30) Yves Mamou, "Place A la fiction Frqaise" ,  Le Monde (Paris), 23-24 April 1995. 
31) Interview with Ok-Hwan Wi, Seoul, Korea, 26 February 1997. Conducted and translated 
by Sanghyun Yoon. All translations from Korean are by Yoon, unless otherwise 
indicated. 
32) Ibid, emphasis in original. 
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The truth of the matter, however, is that the government does provide 
inducements for local production of film and television shows. Until 1985, 
foreign films could only be imported by producers of Korean films, and then they 
could only import one foreign film for every four Korean films produced.33) In 
December 1995 the government passed the Motion Picture Promotion Law. This 
law is explicitly dirigiste and empowers the Ministry of Culture and Sports: 
to make and implement motion picture promotion policies ... [includina 1) 
investigation, research, and development to bring about production, 
utilization, distribution, supply, export, and import of motion pictures, 2) 
raising of experts on movie production ... 3) gaining of financial resources for 
movie promotion and effective operation, 4) vitakation of international 
exchanges of films, and 5) other promotion of film art.34) 
The South Korean government also finances the Comprehensive Film Studio, 
which includes production and post-production facilities. I t  is primarily for the 
benefit of Korean film producers, since television producers have their own 
facilities and seldom use it.35) Perhaps more importantly, the government 
reclassified the movie business from a service industry to a manufacturing 
industry, which allowed producers for the first time to finance their Alms by 
borrowing from banks.36) This move encouraged chaehls to enter the industry, 
with Samsung and Daewoo taking an early interest. 
Like the French, the Koreans also maintain an elaborate systems of quotas to 
protect domestic producers and the Korean culture. Television broadcasters in 
Korea must limit foreign films to no more than 15% of all programs. On cable 
TV, 70% of shows must be Korean (50% for science, technology, culture, and 
sports channels).37) Film distribution is also protected. Korean cinemas must 
exhibit Korean films no less than 120 days a year (i.e., exhibition of Korean films 
is guaranteed at least two-fifths of the year in Korean theaters).38) 
33) Damon Darlin, "Hollywood on the Han," Forbes, 10 October 1994, pp. 81-82. 
34) Motion Picture Promotion Law of December 1995, Article 3. 
35) Follow-up interview by telephone with Mr. Ok-Hwan Wi, April 1997. 
36) Darlin, p. 82. 
37) Follow-up interview with Ok-Hwan Wi. 
38) Ibid. 
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VI . Corporate Responses to Dirigiste Regimes 
One statistic indicates the problem: 80% of the earnings on the Korean film 
market are derived from American films.39) This means that despite the fact that 
40% of cinema projection time is reserved for Korean films, less than 20% of 
overall income is derived from them. Clearly, the patrons of Korean cinemas 
prefer American films. This is also true in France and the rest of Europe, 
although the statistics may be a bit less lopsided.40) The world's spectators prefer 
movies from Hollywood. 
Initial responses in Korea to the sudden influx of American films after the 1985 
trade agreement with the US411 included Korean producers hiring thugs to toss 
snakes and smoke bombs into theaters showing American films.42) This was, at 
best, a short-term solution. However, business people are not fools, and those in 
the Korean and French entertainment industries have now developed strategies to 
meet this challenge. While the governments of both countries have acted to 
preserve a certain cultural distance from American influence, the policies have 
clearly not been effective and the response of the private sector in both Korea 
and France has been to find guidance in the old American adage, "If you can't 
beat 'em, join 'em." 
In 1995, Miky(Mie Kyung) Lee and her brother Jae Hyun agreed to invest over 
$300 million in DreamWorks SKG, the new studio founded by Steven Spielberg, 
Jeffrey Katzenberg and David Geffen. Their company, Cheil Jedang, became the 
second largest outside investor -- after Microsoft's Paul Allen -- in Hollywood's 
most glamorous start-up. In exchange for this bold move, Cheil Jedang received 
distribution rights for DreamWorks products in Asia (with the exception of Japan, 
Australia and New Zealand) and seats on the board of directors and executive 
committee.43) Cheil Jedang also concluded agreements with Raymond Chow, a 
39) Ibid 
40) MPA Worldwide Market Research, "Theatrical Admissions, Releases. Productions and 
Economic Benefits of MPA Member Company Operations in Selected EU Countries and 
Combined EU Countries", unpublished report for the Motion Picture Association of 
America, November 1994. We are grateful to Ms. Bonnie Richardson, vice president for 
trade and federal affairs of the Motion Picture Association of America for this report. 
41) When protectionist measures were somewhat liberalized. 
42) Darlin, op. cit., p. 81. 
43) Evlyn Iritani, "New Name in Lights in S .  Korea," Los Angeles Times, 19 August 1996, 
pp. A-1, A-6. 
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Hong Kong film tycoon, and several other Asian entertainment companies to 
distribute western and Asian flms in Asia and to build multiplex cinemas on the 
continent. 44) 
With the informal encouragement of the Korean government, the Lees' goal is to 
construct a vertically integrated multi-media group.45) After all, President Kim 
Young Sam has said that the value-added of Jurassic Park equals the production 
of 1.5 million autos.46) According to Ms. Lee, the association with DreamWorks is 
intended to provide know-how: "What we want from DreamWorks is industry 
know-how, marketing and management skills, how we can idenw things that 
are attractive to the audience, etc. We leave their product to Steven Spielberg."47) 
To this end, Cheil Jedang is sending interns to its Hollywood partner to acquire 
knowledge in marketing, intellectual property, contracting with talent (writers and 
directors), and film finance. Eventually, Cheil Jedang hopes to sell multi-media 
products on world markets, and especially in China.48) 
Like the Koreans, the French media companies have also seen that their 
success at home is best assured by working with Hollywood, not against it. 
Canal Plus, the major pay-TV channel in Europe, is convinced that its popularity 
and expansion depends upon a continuous flow of Hollywood movies.49) To 
assure that flow, they too have taken ownership stakes in American companies. 
However, this strategy has its risks, as the company's investment in the ill-fated 
Carolco illustrates.50) Never- theless, French companies are undeterred. The 
conglomerate, Chargeurs, S.A., has been a player in Hollywood for some time, 
and Gaumont recently entered the summer blockbuster market by financing 
French director Luc Besson's science fiction extravaganza, The Ft$h Element, 
which was filmed in England and received distribution assistance from Columbia 
Pictures. Despite having an American star (Bruce Willis) and being originally 
filmed in the English language, the movie was warmly welcomed in France and 
opened the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Cannes Film Festival. 
44) "Starstruck," The Economist, 25 November 1995, p. 60. 




49) Various interviews by Feigenbaum in France, April- May 1995. 
50) For a discussion of the failure of Carolco, an independent film producer, see James 
Stemgold, "Debacle on the High Seas," New York Times, 31 March 1996, section 2, 
pp. 1, 22, and 23. 
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Technology Affects Policy 
Recent changes in both the economic structure and the technology of the 
entertainment industry have dramatically impacted the effectiveness of 
government policies regarding the media. The rising costs of special effects and 
premium salaries to stars have forced film makers to spread their costs over 
international, as well as domestic markets. Television production has also been 
driven to internationalize. For example, Movies of the week (films made especially 
for television) are routinely produced outside of the US (usually in Canada) to 
take advantage of exchange rates, tax incentives, and lower union wages. Also, 
foreign sales typically account for 30% of the revenues of television dramas and 
12% of comedies. This increased revenue has been made possible by the growth 
of privately owned television networks in Europe and Latin America, many of 
which have been made possible through new satellite distribution methods. Thus 
American producers and non-American broadcasters of entertainment programs 
increasingly rely upon free trade of entertainment products (known as cultural 
s e ~ c e s  in the language of G A '  
Government enforcement of trade restrictions, on the other hand, has become 
increasingly problematic. This is not just because powerful domestic interests 
(such as televison networks) have an increased incentive to lobby governments for 
free trade, but also because changes in technology have made it much more 
difficult to enforce the policies of the past. First, direct satellite broadcasting 
easily escapes various quota systems. Not only would jamming their emissions 
run counter to democratic traditions, but the increase in the number of channels 
has complicated the problem for erstwhile regulators. Also, with the introduction 
of digital satellite television, the world demand for product has increased 
meteorically. This is because digital compression technology allows hundreds of 
shows to be broadcasted at the same time and allows for video-on-demand. 
Movies can be shown with starting times at 10-minute intervals and eventually 
permit customers to pick and choose what they want to see when they want to 
see it.51) 
51) Since not all parts of a picture move, only the moving parts need be transmitted. This 
reduces the amount of information necessary per frequency band, and thus increasing 
the carrying capacity of each band of the broadcast spectrum. Consequently, the 
number of shows on the bandwidth can be increased many times. A television show or 
movie, then, can be shown at a hundred different times, or more, allowing the 
consumer to choose the most convenient time. This is called "near television-on- 
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Under such conditions, quotas are meaningless. Moreover, the need for 
stupendous investment and huge amounts of product to distribute over hundreds 
of channels has forced television to globalize on both the supply and demand 
sides. 
Since entertainment is an enormous value-added industry that stimulates vast 
numbers of high technolo@ jobs, governments are right to insist that their 
citizens get a piece of the action. This means creating the conditions necessary 
for locally owned companies to remain competitive in an intense international 
market. Protectionist solutions which require compartmentalizing national 
markets, however, are no longer technologically feasible. Under such conditions, 
the corporate strategies which pursue alliances so as to make domestically 
produced entertainment products more attractive to consumers seem the best 
way to assure the survival of French, Korean and, indeed, any other national 
media companies, and with them, the national cultures they reflect. 
W . Conclusion 
Historically, media companies have focused on market size as the linchpin of 
cost structure. Thus the American entertainment industry's capacity to amortize 
costs over its large domestic market, causing the marginal cost of exports to fall 
to zero, has allowed American products to out-compete all other countries. 
Whatever the truth to this argument, conditions have changed. Not only are 
American companies increasingly dependent on foreign markets to recover costs, 
but the internationalization of media markets have accustomed viewers to watch 
foreign products dubbed into local languages. This, we argue, creates an 
opportunity for non-English speakers to sell abroad and thus to amortize the 
costs of their own production. This strategy, however, requires these producers to 
improve the quality of their products to world (i.e., American) standards. 
The argument of this article has been that gobalization of film and television 
industries need not pose a threat to national culture. While these industries have 
been dominated by "Hollywood products, Hollywood itself has become 
internationalized. The fact that people around the world watch American films 
and television shows need not mean that their national cultures are threatened. 
When national media companies (be they Korean, French, or any other) invest in 
demand". As band-width capacity increases, "television-on-demand" becomes possible. 
Global Stratega'es for National Culture: Korean Media Policy in International Pempective 143 
American-based f m s ,  both sides of the deal benefit. Hollywood companies 
receive capital, while the national firms receive know-how, technology, and 
commercially viable products. Thus Cheil Jedang, or Gaumont can learn how to 
make products that draw on their own national cultures, but which are popular 
with consumers both from their own respective cultures and, potentially, from 
around the world. The result of international cooperation is a more viable 
national industry. 
Our evidence for this has been anecdotal, of course, at least partially because 
the phenomenon of Korean and French companies seeking American alliances is 
rather new. Nonetheless, we think that the recent experience of these companies, 
as well as the changes in technology, call out for a rethinking of the policies of 
cultural protectionism practiced not only in these two countries, but around the 
globe. 
Moreover, globalization of production has made even American television and 
movies less clearly American. With talent coming from so many countries, with 
production facilities around the world competing for business, deflning what 
constitutes a "national" film industry is an increasingly difficult and ultimately 
anachronistic task. What nationality is a movie filmed at an Enghsh studio with 
an American star and a French director, as was The Aih Element? The Cannes 
Film Festival, to take a high profile example, originally categorized films by 
country of origin, but it abandoned this long ago. 
F'inally, extended leisure time and better salaries in any nation can only stimulate 
the demand for increased quality in all media products. If companies are to be 
capable of producing f h  and television shows in their national languages that 
reflect their national cultures (whether they be Korean, French, German or Chinese), 
global strategies for these industries cannot be ignored. Consequently, gb-n 
is not always a constraint on national policy. Sometimetimes it enables that policy to 
take place. G l o b ~ t i o n ,  in that sense, can be liberating, at least in tenns of 
economic strategy. In media policy at least, to think locally, one must act globally. 
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